We explore the relation between corporate loan spreads and performance pricing covenants (PPCs) which automatically adjustment interest-rate spread when a change occurs in the borrower's subsequent performance. We pioneer separate measurement of the impact of performance pricing depending on whether it is based on accounting ratios such debt-to-EBITDA (common practice for smaller, riskier borrowers) or on the borrower's debt rating. Applying a matched-pairs technique holding borrower and lending syndicate constant, we find that over 90% of PPCs are accounting-based and for this sub-sample the average spread reduction is 45.8 basis points. In contrast, debt-rating-based PPCs result in spreads that are only 3-4 basis points lower a difference that is only weakly statistically significant. We distinguish between interest-increasing and decreasing PPCs. Identifying the latter as a tight covenant in the covenant signaling framework of Demiroglu and James (2010), we show that such covenants are associated with significantly greater spread reduction.
Introduction
Performance pricing covenants (PPCs) in bank loans specify adjustments to the interestrate spread when some measure of the borrower's subsequent performance changes. PPCs employ two alternative performance metrics: accounting-based measures, such as the debt-to-EBITDA ratio, and debt-ratings-based performance measures, such as the Moody's or Standard & Poor's rating of the borrower's bonds or commercial paper. They also differ in the direction of spread adjustment: interest-increasing PPCs specify higher spreads should borrower credit quality decline offering automatic protection to the lending bank. Interest-decreasing PPCs provide for narrower spreads should credit quality improve. By presenting an alternative to prepaying or renegotiating loans in such circumstances, PPCs offer reduced transactions costs to both parties.
PPCs are of interest because they provide an opportunity to study the value of accounting information vs. debt ratings. The accuracy of debt ratings has received considerable attention in light of the criticism of bond rating agencies in the wake of the recent financial crisis (Fridson (2010) ). Further, as an innovation in covenant design, PPCs represent an opportunity for further testing of the signaling theory of covenants developed by Gerleanu and Zwiebel (2006) and Demiroglu and James (2010) .
The central task of this paper is to measure how the introduction of a performance pricing covenant influences loan spreads. In a close antecedent to our work, Asquith, Beatty and Weber (2005) employ a joint model of the decision to introduce either interest-increasing or interestdecreasing performance pricing and the LIBOR spread. Our tests differ from theirs in several important respects. First, we pioneer separate measurement of the impact of performance pricing depending on whether it is accounting-or debt-rating-based. This distinction matters because firms with accounting-based performance are riskier (have higher initial spreads and greater volatility of credit risk during the loan's life), borrow at longer maturities, are smaller, and are more likely to secure loans. In contrast, firms choosing to structure performance pricing based on credit ratings are larger and more complex. As a result, their accounting numbers require greater adjustment and are thus less suitable to simple rules in accounting-based performance pricing covenants. Accordingly, such firms prefer bond ratings as a performance-pricing benchmark as these are considered to be a comprehensive measure of credit risk. Further, the greater volatility of credit risk for these borrowers increases the value of the lender's option (in the case of interest-increasing performance pricing). Expected recontracting costs are higher for such firms and their lenders. As a result, we hypothesize that performance pricing (whether interestincreasing or decreasing) should have a greater impact on the initial spread when it is accounting based.
Second, we reexamine the theoretical rationale given in Asquith et al. for distinguishing between interest-increasing and decreasing performance pricing. That paper argues that because an interest-increasing PPC has value to the lender, the bank must compensate borrowers with a lower rate. They report a rate differential of just under 26 basis points. For interest-decreasing PPCs, Asquith et al. note that such contracts allow borrowers with improved credit quality to enjoy lower rates automatically without either side incurring the costs of loan prepayment or renegotiation. Because the benefit from lower costs may go to either side, they leave it to empirical testing to determine the impact on spreads. They report an economically small and marginally significant, positive coefficient, interpreting this as evidence that "borrowers may gain slightly more than lenders by decreasing the renegotiation costs" (p124).
Our separation of PPCs according to the measure of performance allows us to draw on Doyle (2003) for insight on how interest-decreasing PPC should impact spread. It is likely that for higher risk firms choosing accounting-based performance pricing, bargaining power is low; hence the main saving in recontracting costs goes to the lender. This suggests that interestincreasing performance pricing reduces the initial spread. Put another way, for accounting-based PPC, we hypothesize that introduction of PPC reduces spread regardless of whether it is interestincreasing or decreasing. Demiroglu and James (2010) analyze covenants as a signaling mechanism designed to attenuate information asymmetry. 1 In their framework, borrowers have private information about their future prospects. By accepting loan terms with tight covenants, the borrower signals that it believes its financial state will improve. Consistent with this covenant-signaling hypothesis, they find that firms with tight covenants display stronger future operating performance. Further, announcements of loans to such firms have higher than average positive stock market reaction.
Both results are supportive of the signaling view of covenant design.
Viewed in the covenant signaling framework of Demiroglu and James (2010), interestdecreasing performance pricing is generally a tighter covenant than its interest-increasing counterpart. We illustrate the distinction with a hypothetical example of a company that is borrowing at LIBOR plus 100 basis points and currently has a debt/EBITDA ratio of three.
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Using an interest-increasing, accounting-based PPC, the company would agree to increase its spread to 125 basis point should debt / EBITDA rise to 3.5 and to 150 basis points for a ratio of 5 1 Related prior theoretical research motivates the existence of PPC as a device to reduce the agency costs of debt (Tchistyi (2005) . 2 Our example draws on Asquith et al. (2005) , Beatty, Dichev and Weber (2002) and Demiroglu and James (2010). 4.0. Beyond debt/EBITDA of 4.5, the loan becomes due on demand. This is a relaxed covenant as it gives the company slack should its debt ratio deteriorate. In contrast, with a tight covenant:
borrowing at LIBOR as before, the company would now agree that the loan becomes due on demand if its debt/EBITDA ratio should rise to 3.5. Further interest-reducing provisions would state that the spread would narrow to 75 basis points if the ratio falls to 2.5 and to 50 basis points for a ratio of two.
The tighter covenant package consisting of a lower same-variable covenant provision and an interest-decreasing PPC constitutes a signal that the firm expects its financial strength to improve. Such signals are quite common. In their empirical study, Asquith et al. report that interest-decreasing PPC is almost twice as prevalent as interest-increasing. As a positive signal, we predict that interest-decreasing PPC should be associated with lower spreads. We report strong empirical evidence supporting this prediction.
Third, we use matched pairs methodology and take advantage of a natural experiment to control for self-selection bias that likely arises because, as discussed above, firm risk characteristics influence the decision to introduce performance pricing as well as the selection of design features: interest-increasing or decreasing, accounting or debt-rating-based. The natural experiment arises from the common practice of structuring loan deals consisting of multiple loan facilities issued on the same day with a common lead bank and set of participant lenders. Since some of the facilities in a loan deal contain a PPC and others do not, we can compare the impact of the PPC while holding borrower and lender characteristics constant. In employing matching techniques, we follow earlier papers in the literature such as Helwege and Turner (1999 ), Bharath (2002 ), and Gottesman and Roberts (2004 and 2007 , among others.
Our study uses the Loan Pricing Corporation DealScan database of loans initiated from 1994 to 1999. 3 Our key results are as follows. First, our pooled sample tests reveal that the presence of a PPC of any type results in spreads that are 24.6 basis points lower than they would be without the PPC. Similarly to prior studies, we also find that there are important differences in borrower characteristics between loan facilities with and without PPCs.
Applying our matching technique we find that in its more refined control setting, the presence of any PPC is associated with a reduction in spread of 40.4 basis points. Of the 1,078
matched pairs in our sample, 941 include an accounting-based PPC. For this set of pairs, the average spread is 45.8 basis points lower with the PPC. In contrast, debt-rating-based PPCs result in spreads that are only approximately 3-4 basis points lower than they would be without the PPC, a difference that is only weakly statistically significant. We conclude that the rate spread benefits associated with PPCs are mainly limited to accounting-based-PPCs. Our results also provide compelling evidence that estimating the effect of loan contract terms such as PPCs using pooled regressions can lead to estimation errors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data extraction and matching methodology. Sections 3 and 4 present the univariate and multivariate tests, respectively. Section 5 concludes. Signed Rank statistic to determine whether any identified differences are significant. The results of these tests are reported in Table 3 . Our key finding is that loan facilities without PPCs are associated with spreads that are 24.631 basis points higher than loan facilities with PPCs, significant at the 1% level for both the t and Wilcoxon statistics.
Data extraction and matching methodology

TABLE 3 HERE
We find significant differences between the two groups of loan facilities for almost all other variables as well. These differences are all at the 1% level forthe t and Wilcoxon tests with the exception of some financial covenants. We find that lower risk borrowers with higher bond ratings are more likely to avoid PPCs consistent with the covenant signaling hypothesis. This result is clouded by the fact that loan facilities without PPCs are more commonly associated with borrowers whose bond rating is missing; hence the full risk effect is uncertain. We find that loan facilities without PPCs are less frequently associated with publicly traded firms, and are associated with smaller borrowers. We also find that loan facilities without PPCs are shorter and smaller than loan facilities with PPCs, and less often are revolvers or syndicated loans. These pooled sample results are generally consistent with Asquith, et al. (2005) . They indicate that performance pricing tends to be included in loans with higher re-contracting, adverse selection, and moral hazard costs, such as syndicated loans, revolving loan facilities, loans used for takeover purpose, and loans with longer maturities.
Further, loan facilities without PPCs are less often secured. But as we found for rating, this result is blurred by the tendency for loan facilities without PPCs to be associated with borrowers whose securitization status is missing; hence the full securitization effect is uncertain. Finally, we find that loan facilities without PPCs are generally less likely to include financial covenants. This is consistent with Beatty, et al. (2002) who report that the typical contract sets the initial pricing at the high-cost end of the performance pricing grid to handle credit improvements, while a same-variable covenant is set tightly beyond the top of the grid to handle credit deteriorations.
In brief, while the results in Table 3 constitute strong evidence that loan facilities without
PPCs have higher spreads than their counterparts with PPCs, the two samples are widely disparate. To control for disparities related to borrower characteristics as well as for unobserved lender differences, we turn to matched pair tests.
Matched pairs tests
Difference of means tests using our matched sample control more effectively for non-spread differences between loan facilities without and with PPCs. The results of these tests for all PPC are reported in Table 4 (columns 1-3). By construction, there is no difference in all borrowers' characteristics (BWMD, BONDRATE, TICKER, and BWSSIZE) between the elements in any pair. Further, within each pair, the lead bank and participant lenders are identical so we also control for any unobserved variation in lender features.
TABLE 4 HERE
Since some matched samples contain a small number of observations possibly resulting in a violation of the assumption of normality underlying the parametric Student's t test, we also conduct nonparametric Wilcoxon tests. The key result of higher spreads for loan facilities without PPCs reported for the pooled sample holds more strongly for the sample of all PPC matches: the mean difference in spread for the matched sample here is 40.420 basis points in comparison to 24.631 basis points for the pooled sample in Table 3 . While our matched sample methodology controls for borrower characteristics, we continue to identify significant differences between the two groups of loan facilities for other variables besides the spread. For the sample of all matches, opposite to our finding for the pooled sample, we find that loan facilities without PPCs bear longer maturities than loan facilities with PPCs, significant at the 1% level for both the t and Wilcoxon statistics. Similarly to our finding for the pooled sample, loan facilities without PPCs are smaller than loan facilities with PPCs, and are less likely to be revolvers, significant at the 1% level for both the t and Wilcoxon statistics. We do not find significant differences for syndication.
To summarize, the difference of means tests for the matched sample demonstrate that loan facilities without PPCs are associated with even higher spreads under the refined control setting associated with matched pairs. Finally, there continue to be significant loan characteristic differences between loan facilities with and without PPCs. In Section 4 we perform multivariate tests to control for these differences. These borrowers are also smaller and more likely to borrow on a secured basis. These differences are statistically significant for both the pooled and matched samples.
Accounting-based vs. debt-rating based performance pricing covenants
Based on the riskier profile of borrowers using ACCPPC, the covenant signaling hypothesis suggests that the inclusion of a PPC will reduce spreads by a greater amount than for borrowers with DEBTPPC. The results in Table 4 basis points higher than loan facilities without PPCs. Further, this result is only significant for the t-statistic, and at the 5% level. While these results support our hypothesis, it remains for multivariate tests to control for differences within pairs on loan characteristics also documented in Table 4 .
Interest-increasing vs. interest-decreasing performance pricing covenants
As stated above, tearsheets describing the pricing grids are required to identify interestincreasing (INTINCR) and interest-decreasing (INTDECR) features in PPCs. These are available for a subset of loan facilities for which summary statistics appear in Table 1 As a tight covenant, we predict that inclusion of an INDECR PPC is expected to reduce spreads according to the covenant signaling hypothesis. The matched pair tests in 
Nonparametric univariate counting tests
The results of the univariate tests discussed so far demonstrate that through using the matched pair methodology, we are able to create two groups that are highly similar. The parametric difference of means tests discussed above provide strong evidence that loan facilities identical, or lower spreads, than the paired loan facility with the PPC. We report the results of these counting tests in panels A (all matched pairs), B (ACCPPC) and C (DEBTPPC) of Table 5 separately for matched pairs associated with borrower Moody' senior debt ratings of A, B, C, and unrated. We also tabulate the percentage higher, identical, lower, and the number of pairs for each sample.
TABLE 5 HERE
For the all PPC and ACCPPC matched pair samples in Table 5 , we find further strong evidence that loan facilities without PPCs are associated with higher spreads than the those with PPCs. Overall, for 71% of all matched pairs and 79% of ACCPPC matched pairs, the loan facility without the PPC is associated with higher spreads than the loan facility with the PPC, while the reverse is true for only 10% and 9% of the matched pairs, respectively. We find similar results for the A, B, C, and unrated borrower cases, with the exception of the A-rated case for the all PPC matched pair sample. In this case, we find a very large proportion where spreads are identical for both elements in the pair. This indicates that performance pricing is not as beneficial to high quality borrowers.
The results for the DEBTPPC matched pair sample are more ambiguous, and correspond to our findings for the parametric difference of means tests. Overall, 12% of matched pairs exhibit higher spreads for the loan facility without the PPC over the loan facility with the PPC, while the reverse is true in 18% of the matched pairs. More interestingly, spreads are identical in 70% of the matched pairs. These results are generally consistent for borrowers rated A, B, and unrated. There are no observations in this sample where the borrower is rated C.
In summary, the nonparametric counting tests in Table 5 
Multivariate tests
This section reports our multivariate tests. Table 6 presents the correlations between the variables used in the regression tests. security from some regressions is that they are jointly determined along with the spread and the inclusion and type of performance pricing. We therefore exclude these variables from some regressions to ensure that our results are robust in the possible presence of endogeneity.
We perform the regressions separately for the pooled, ACCPPC, and DEBTPPC matched pair samples as well as for the matched interest-increasing and decreasing samples. We further refine the regressions through testing the model for two groupings of facilities; those for which debt rating is provided (Table 7) , and those loan facilities that are unrated (Table 8) . Hence the regressions in Table 7 
Regression tests, pooled sample
The results for the pooled sample are reported in columns 1-3 of Tables 7, Panel A (rated) and Table 8 , Panel A (unrated). For both groupings, there is strong evidence that both ACCPPC and DEBTPPC covenants reduce spreads. The results are similar when all controls are used and when TFCMAT is excluded, columns (1) and (2), respectively. For the rated grouping (Table 7) , the coefficients associated with ACCPPC are -24.56 and -22.12 when all controls are used and when TFCMAT is excluded, respectively, while the coefficients associated with DEBTPPC are -26.21 and -27.27 when all controls are used and when TFCMAT is excluded.
These results are significant at the 1% level. For the unrated grouping ( for ACCPPC and DEBTPPC, respectively, significant at the 1% level.
Regression tests, ACCPPC and DEBTPPC matched samples
The above results suggest that both ACCPPC and DEBTPPC are associated with lower spreads than are loan facilities without PPCs. Yet as we demonstrated in Section 3, there are many important differences between the with-and without-PPC samples; hence even in a multivariate setting these results may be attributable to differences unrelated to the presence or absence of PPCs. If, however, as hypothesized, these results flow the presence of PPCs, then they should continue to hold in the more refined control setting that we created using our matching methodology.
The results for the ACCPPC matched sample are presented in columns 4-6 of Table 7 , Panel A (rated) and Table 8 , Panel A (unrated) and provide strong evidence that ACCPPC results in lower spreads. For the rated grouping (Table 7) , the coefficients associated with ACCPPC are -29.98 and -36.92 when all controls are used (column 4) and when TFCMAT is excluded (column 5), respectively, while the coefficient associated with ACCPPC for the unrated grouping (Table 8) is -36.26 and -42.92 when all controls are used and when TFCMAT is excluded.
These results are significant at the 1% level. When SECURED and SECUREDMISS are excluded, column (6), the coefficient values associated with ACCPPC are -28.67 and -27.93 for the rated and unrated groupings, respectively, significant at the 1% level.
The results for the DEBTPPC matched sample are presented in columns 7-9 of Table 7 , Panel A (rated) and Table 8 , Panel A (unrated). These findings provide strong evidence that DEBTPPC does not result in lower spreads, similar to our results for the univariate tests. The significance associated with the DEBTPPC coefficient in the pooled sample tests vanishes in the matched sample consistent with the view that DEBTPCC does not have significant loan spread effects. Loan spread differences found in the pooled sample are attributable to differences in other variables, such as lender and borrower characteristics, thus, after controlling for these differences in our matched samples, loan spread effects disappear for DEBTPCC. . This result provides strong support for our contention that the matched sample represents a refinement of the pooled sample tests, and clearly indicates that the spread advantage associated with PPCs is limited to ACCPPs.
Regression tests, INTINCR and INTDECR matched samples
We also conduct similar regressions for the matched samples of INTINCR and INTDECR PPC for the rated ( 
Control variables
As expected, in Tables 7 and 8 we find that spreads are lower for higher rated, publicly traded, and larger borrowers, though the coefficients associated with the variable that measures public trading, TICKER, is generally insignificant for the ACCPPC matched sample, for both rated and unrated groupings, and is generally insignificant for the DEBTPPC matched sample, for the unrated grouping. We also generally find a positive relation between spreads and facility maturity for the rated grouping. For the pooled sample and ACCPPC matched sample, we find strong evidence of lower spreads associated with revolvers, and find weak evidence of a positive relation between spreads and syndication for the pooled sample. We find strong evidence of higher spreads associated with securitization, reflecting the earlier literature, and also find broad evidence of higher spreads for facilities for which securitization status is missing. Finally, spreads are generally unrelated to financial covenants, with some exceptions.
Conclusions
Performance pricing covenants (PPC) are predicted to reduce loan spreads as they serve to control costs associated with asymmetric information, adverse selection, moral hazard and recontracting (Asquith et al. (2005) ). This paper tests and supports this view using a carefully matched sample of loan facilities initiated between 1994 and 1999 and documented in the Loan Pricing Corporation DealScan database.
Our main new result is that the type of performance pricing matters: compared against controls, loans with accounting-based performance pricing enjoy significantly lower spreads while we detect only small and weakly significant differences in loans which base performance pricing on debt ratings. After controlling for borrower and lender characteristics, accountingbased PPC results in spreads that are approximately 45 basis points lower than they would be without the PPC in univariate tests, and ranges from 30-35 in subsequent multivariate tests. In contrast, debt-rating-based PPC results in spreads that are only approximately 5 basis points lower than without the PPC, a difference that is statistically significant at a lower confidence level and which is largely insignificant in subsequent multivariate tests of the debt-rating based PPC matched pair sample. These results reflect the role of PPC in resolving information asymmetry which is more prevelant in riskier borrowers more likely to employ accounting-based covenants. Further, they are also consistent with Doyle (2003) who suggests that accounting ratios are more timely reflectors of changes in credit quality. While accounting ratios are updated quarterly, debt ratings are revised at most every six months except when a firm experiences a crisis. Accordingly, accounting ratios are more sensitive and better reflect changes in borrowers' credit risk and therefore, accounting-based performance pricing adds more value than debt-rating based. .
In addition, our paper identifies interest-decreasing PPC as a tight covenant in the covenant signaling framework of Demiroglu and James (2010) in which firms take on tight covenants as a signal that their financial condition will improve. This leads to the prediction, strongly supported in our tests, that interest-decreasing PPC should be associated with lower spreads.
Finally, our matching methodology uncovers an interesting empirical regularity. Firms often take out several loan facilities from the same lenders on the same day and typically include a performance pricing feature in the shorter-maturity loan only. This finding contrasts with Asquith et al. (2005) who report that the probability of employing performance-pricing increases with maturity. According to our results, performance pricing tends most often to be a feature of loans with shorter maturities. This is consistent with the notion that borrowers have limited ability to predict their performance far into the future. Thus, for longer-maturity loans, borrowers might be unwilling to reduce their initial borrowing costs by including performance pricing fearing that, if their performance deteriorated in the future, loan spreads would increase resulting in higher ex post borrowing costs. For loans with shorter maturities, borrowers are likely able to predict their companies' performance with more confidence and if they think that their companies' performance will get better, or at least not get worse, they will be willing to include performance pricing in their loan contracts and obtain lower loan spreads. Put another way, firms balance the signaling benefits of performance pricing against the danger of facing higher costs in future if the signal is false. Since uncertainty in forecasts increases with the time horizon, there is a point beyond which performance pricing is seen as too risky. Testing this conjecture is left for future research.
Further, we find that firms enjoy significant spread reduction from usage of performance pricing covenants, particularly accounting based PPCs, and this raises the question why firms do not use PPCs more extensively. . In addition, it is worth examining whether there are any firms utilizing both accounting based and debt-rating based performance pricing covenants within the same deal package. We leave these interesting issues for future research. Table 3 . Difference of means tests, pooled sample. We present the difference of the mean variable value between those loan facilities without PPCs and those with, and calculate the Student's T-statistic and Wilcoxon Signed Rank statistic. Variable definitions are as follows: RATEAISD is the basis point coupon spread over LIBOR plus the annual fee and upfront fee, spread over the life of the loan. BWMD is the Moody's senior debt rating, where the nonmissing ratings of Aaa through C are translated into an ordinal scale ranging from 28 to 8. BONDRATE is an indicator variable that equals unity if the borrower has a bond rating. TICKER is an indicator variable that is equal to unity if the borrower has a ticker symbol. BWSSIZE is the borrower's sales size. TFCMAT is the months to maturity. AMTFCSIZ is the facility size. REVOLVER and SYND are indicator variables that equal unity if the loan is a revolving loan or syndicated, respectively. SECURED and SECUREDMISS are indicator variables that equal to unity if the loan is designated as secured by the database or if the securitization status is missing, respectively. FCOVENT1-12 are indicator variables that are equal to unity if there is are coverage covenants based on the fixed charge (FCOVENT1); debt service (FCOVENT2); interest (FCOVENT3); cash interest (FCOVENT4); leverage ratio (FCOVENT5); debt-to-cash flow (FCOVENT6); senior debt-to-cash flow (FCOVENT7); debt-to-tangible net worth (FCOVENT8); debt-to-equity (FCOVENT9); current ratio (FCOVENT10); tangible net worth (FCOVENT11); and net worth (FCOVENT12).
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 005, and 0.10 level. Table 5 . Counting tests, matched sample. The number of times that the facility without a performance pricing covenant (PPC) of a matched pair has a higher, identical, or lower value for the rates all in spread (RATEAISD) variable relative to the facility with a PPC is reported. These values are reported for all matched pairs (Panel A), matched pairs where the facility with a PPC is an accounting-based PPC (ACCPPC), matched pairs where the facility with a PPC is a debt-rating-based PPC (DEBTPPC), matched pairs where the facility with a PPC is interest increasing (INTINCR), and matched pairs where the facility with a PPC is a interest decreasing (INTDECR). These results are reported for all rating categories, and are reported separately for matched pairs associated with borrower with Moody' senior debt ratings of A, B, C, and unrated. We also report the percentage higher, identical, lower, and the number of paired observations for each sample. 
